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"An under-appreciated evil of substantial frauds . . . is how they pit
their victims against one another."'
INTRODUCTION
This article proposes the application of an existing solution to a
recurring problem concerning bankruptcy and criminal forfeiture. It
examines the existing procedures used by bankruptcy trustees and U.S.
Attorneys to investigate financial fraud and to compensate the victims of
such fraud.2 Traditionally, bankruptcy trustees and U.S. Attorneys inves-
tigate different areas of the law, which rarely overlap. Bankruptcy trust-
* The author is a 2011 magna cum laude graduate of the University of Miami School of
Law and is an associate at Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, in Coral Gables, Florida. She wishes to thank
her husband for his patience and support in this endeavor. She also wishes to thank Professor
Anthony V. Alfieri, Barbara Brandon, Professor Sergio Campos, Professor Patricia Redmond,
Robin Schard, Evelyn B. Sheehan, and Francesco Zincone for their creative and meticulous
editing and continuous direction and encouragement, as well as the University of Miami Law
Review for transforming this piece into a publishable article. Lastly, she would like to thank Dr.
Martin J. Sweet for always imploring her to chase her dreams.
1. United States v. Dreier, 682 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. "The U.S. Attorney's Offices contributed to the collection of $1.8 billion in asset
forfeiture actions in FY2010. Forfeited assets are deposited into either the
Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund or the Department of Treasury
Forfeiture Fund and are used to restore funds to crime victims and for a variety of
law enforcement purposes."
Press Release, United States Attorney's Office Dist. of Conn., U.S. Attorney's Office Collects
More Than $24 Million in FY2010 (Jan. 13, 2011).
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ees focus on legal activities, while the U.S. Attorneys focus on criminal
activities, and both are governed by separate statutory frameworks.
Recently, however, a number of fraud schemes have involved otherwise
legal business entities, thereby entangling the once-isolated worlds of
criminal forfeiture and bankruptcy. This article addresses the problems
that arise from the resulting collision of bankruptcy and criminal law,
and proposes minor legal reforms that satisfy the objectives of both
areas of law.
The collision of bankruptcy and criminal law typically arises when
the collapse of the fraud scheme throws an organization voluntarily or
otherwise into bankruptcy. Once the organization is in bankruptcy, juris-
dictional battles can ensue to determine who best can marshal all of the
assets belonging to the perpetrator and distribute the proceeds to victims
and creditors. As bankruptcy trustees and U.S. Attorneys attempt to
solve a legal juggernaut unforeseen by existing law, victims and credi-
tors stand by and watch as their hopes of collecting a fraction of what
they lost dwindle as fees rise and values of forfeited property depreciate.
Ironically, these battles to determine who is best to collect and distribute
the assets of the fraud result in draining the asset pool, making the vic-
tims worse off. This article uses the recent litigation in United States v.
Rothstein' as a cautionary tale, showing that the jurisdictional tete-A-t&te
that occurred between the bankruptcy trustee and the U.S. Attorney's
Office squandered' assets available to the victims and undermined the
bankruptcy and criminal objectives reflected in law,' to compensate the
victims.
Instead of dragging financial victims and creditors through such
endless battles, this article proposes a simple solution. In essence, the
article proposes that, at the time that the government chooses to indict
the defendant fraudster, it should consider strongly to indict the corpora-
tion subject (or potentially subject) to bankruptcy. Doing so sets clear
boundaries between the bankruptcy trustee and the U.S. Attorney's
Office, and, as I show below, increases the assets available to the vic-
tims and ensures a fair distribution of those assets.
3. United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, 2009 WL 6411668 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
1, 2009).
4. It is important to note here that although the debate between the bankruptcy trustee and
the United States Attorney's Office in the Rothstein case presented arguments that centered on the
protection and proper distribution of assets, in reality, the litigation moved comparatively quickly.
Had Rothstein not pled guilty, the distribution of assets would have been delayed by several
months due to trial. Further, the eve of Summer 2010 brought a briefing schedule from the district
court, which also assisted in bringing about the speediest possible resolution of the case. All in all,
given the conflict, this was the best-case scenario for the victims under the circumstances.




Corporate criminal liability is not a novel solution. Rather, it has
been imposed as a method of regulating corporate conduct in ebbs and
flows for more than a century.' In the same amount of time, scholars
have struggled with corporate criminal liability on an intellectual level.'
Attribution of personhood to a corporate entity,' meaningful limitations
on vicarious liability,9 and the effectiveness of deterrence"o all prove to
be obstacles for scholars in the field.
Suggesting that U.S. Attorney's Offices include consideration of
corporate criminal liability whenever they prosecute corporate fraud,
requires a different approach to this ongoing debate. The intellectual
obstacles present should be properly weighed against the utility corpo-
rate criminal liability can provide. Corporate criminal liability should be
viewed as an enforcement tool; a means of facilitating coordination
between concurrent civil and criminal proceedings and streamlining liti-
gation. As an enforcement tool, corporate criminal liability offers a sig-
nificant public policy advantage: maximized recovery to claimants in
both the bankruptcy and criminal contexts.
This article has three parts. Part I briefly summarizes the corporate
criminal liability debate to which this article contributes, but more
importantly, this section suggests refraining the debate to focus on the
societal benefits of corporate criminal liability. Part II constitutes a pri-
mer on both bankruptcy and criminal forfeiture procedure, and uses
United States v. Rothstein as a case study of the coordination problems
that arise when the procedures overlap. Part III proposes a solution to
these coordination problems, arguing that U.S. Attorney's Offices han-
dling cases similar to United States v. Rothstein ought to proceed by
indicting both the individual defendant and the corporation in bank-
ruptcy. It further details how this solution is legally viable, equitable,
and practically applicable.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY DEBATE
The struggle to determine whether criminal liability is an appropri-
ate method of corporate regulation has plagued lawyers, judges, and
scholars for more than a hundred years. Debates center on how the lack
of natural personhood and concomitant issues of liability construction
6. See generally WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1-99 (2006).
7. Id.
8. V.S. Khanna, Article, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REv. 1477, 1479-1480 (1996).
9. Id. at 1484-87.
10. Id. at 1495-97.
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affect methods and extent of punishment." A concurrent theme underly-
ing the debate is the apparent need for effective corporate regulation and
enforcement mechanisms. 12 Corporate criminal liability is often imposed
because "[i]f it were not so, many offenses might go unpunished and
acts be committed in violation of law where . . . the statute requires all
persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices, forbidden
in the interest of public policy.""
Suggesting the application of corporationl 4 criminal liability when
doing so would coordinate enforcement efforts and maximize victim
recovery, which is exactly what this article purports to assert, lands this
article squarely within the corporate criminal liability debate. Although
this solution serves a distinct public purpose by creating order and hier-
archy between bankruptcy trustees and U.S. Attorneys, it nevertheless
raises the same concerns pertaining to personhood, construction of lia-
bility, and punishment. Because the proposition offered in this article
touches on these debates, the sections that follow are necessary to pro-
vide the reader with sufficient background to understand where the
Rothstein debacle falls within the debate and why applying corporate
criminal liability in that case is specifically justified.
A. Personhood
While corporate criminal liability is part of the legal tapestry in this
country today, it was not always so. Construction of corporate per-
sonhood began with two distinct theories: artificial entity theory and real
entity theory." Artificial entity theory proceeds from the notion that a
corporation is "nothing more than a creature of law, whose rights con-
sisted only of those conferred by the state." 16 Real entity theory "posited
that the corporation was a naturally occurring being, independent of the
law and separate from its individual shareholders."" Over time, courts
resorted to the application of real entity theory over artificial, founding
11. See Carol R. Goforth, "A Corporation Has No Soul"-Modern Corporations, Corporate
Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 Hous. L. REV. 617, 624 (2010);
Khanna, supra note 8.
12. See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
13. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
14. It is important to note that in the context of the piece, each reference to the "corporation"
should be read to include all types of corporate entities that can be used to facilitate fraud,
including, but not limited to, partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability
corporations.
15. Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Corporate





the analysis on property rights." Though, in actuality, corporations are
mere legal fictions born of the filing of state-specific documents of
incorporation, they are "persons at the law's convenience."' 9 This attri-
bution of personhood allows corporations to sue and be sued in civil
actions; it ascribes certain rights to the organization; and, most impor-
tantly for the purposes of this paper, the construction of personhood
with relation to a corporation facilitates criminally charging the
organization.20
At common law, corporations were not viewed as capable of pos-
sessing the requisite intent to be held criminally liable.2 1 Corporate
criminal activity is considered to be ultra vires.2 2 Born of the submission
of certain signed documents, corporations act through their agents.
These and other qualities of the corporate organization proved intel-
lectually problematic to judges and scholars discussing corporate
personhood.23
However, with the increase in the number of corporations in the
United States and the depth of their involvement in the daily lives of
Americans during the Industrial Revolution and loose regulation, there
was increased opportunity for corporate misconduct. 24 In the decades
following society's reliance on corporations coupled with rampant
unpunished misconduct in the early 1900s, courts began to construe both
personhood and criminal liability upon those corporations.2 5 As scholars
note, at this point in history, courts began to ignore corporate soulless-
ness 26 and ultra vires constraints 27 in favor of imposing liability. At the
turn of the twentieth century, "[e]nforcement concerns heightened as the
nation witnessed the emergence of interstate commerce without effective
legislative restraint." 28 These "early instances of corporate criminal lia-
bility resulted from public harms, such as nuisance, for which private
18. Id. at 1915-16.
19. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 48.
20. See generally LAUFER, supra note 6; Lipton, supra note 15, at 1927.
21. In the historic Dartmouth College case, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that a
corporation is but "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. . . [with] only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it." Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
22. Lipton, supra note 15, at 1926.
23. See generally Goforth, supra note 11.
24. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 23-45.
25. Id. at 20-21.
26. The notion that a corporation has no soul was regarded as an "old maxim of common
law." Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the
Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 933 (2005) (quoting
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 513 (2d ed. 1985)).
27. Goforth, supra note 11, at 630 (citation omitted).
28. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 49 (citation omitted).
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enforcement was unlikely."2 9 Without the intervention of federal legisla-
tion to help quell the storm of corporate takeover, attributing personhood
to corporate entities arose as the only way to ensure that "corporation [s]
and [their] actors properly internalized the cost of their activities to
society."30
Although intent typically serves as the dividing line between civil
and criminal liability, over time the line has blurred. 3 ' This line of
demarcation strikes a disharmonious chord when applied to corporations
for the reasons stated above: namely that a corporation can only act
through its authorized agents and the scope of its existence is expressly
limited by the boundaries of the incorporating documents. Yet, by "the
turn of the twentieth century . . . courts employing personhood as a
threshold requirement for liability realized the costs of viewing corpora-
tions as nothing more than artificial beings, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."3 2 Applying the law of agency,
intent reflects back from officers, directors, employees, and other agents
onto the corporate entity.
B. Liability and Blame
Accepting that corporations can be construed as persons capable of
possessing the requisite intent to commit crimes, we turn to constructing
the theory of that liability. Early theorists in the field of corporate crimi-
nal liability fought to draw a workable standard out of tort law. The
question they endeavored to answer is simple: "In which cases should
liability and blame for criminal acts of corporate agents be attributed to
corporate entities?"3 4 Answering this question, however, is incredibly
complicated. Unlike human actions, "[c]orporate actions reflect a meld-
ing of individual decisions set within an organizational structure and
embedded in an organizational culture."3 This organizational behavior
transcends a single individual and concurrently so does liability. 36 Find-
ing corporate criminal liability under a respondeat superior-type theory
allows one individual's misconduct to reflect on an entire corporate
29. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1485-86 (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 1486 (citation omitted).
31. "If the individual omitted the act purposely, we consider it to be a crime, while if the
individual committed the act accidentally, we do not." Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MuNN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991).
32. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 49 (citation omitted).
33. Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the
Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 459, 475-76 (2004).
34. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 70.
35. Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
36. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazibal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 81, 161-62 (2006).
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entity and, due to the nature of said entities, onto all other agents of it."
Cognizant of these concerns as well as others, a three-part standard
emerged over time. To begin, the corporation must have committed an
illegal act." Further, the act must be committed with intent to commit
the illegal act, mens rea."9 This can be proven on an individual basis,
i.e., that a specific individual had the intent to commit the illegal act or
on a collective basis, i.e., where the employees of the corporation on the
whole or a sufficient group were sufficiently aware that the illegal act
was being committed.4 0
Next, prosecutors must prove that either the individual agent or the
group of agents were within the scope of their employment when he or
they committed the illegal act. The scope of employment is defined as
any "act that 'occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a
job-related activity.' "" As in the areas of tort and business association
law, there are instances when courts will hold corporations liable for the
illegal acts of their employees even if the specific act was forbidden.
Within this element of analysis, the breadth of the term "agent" should
be noted; an agent need not be a member of the board of directors or a
manager.
Finally, it must be shown that the agent intended to benefit the cor-
poration with his illegal actions. This element of the standard is seem-
ingly the easiest to meet. Courts have found that "the employee need not
act with the exclusive purpose of benefiting the corporation"4 2 and
courts do not always require that the corporation actually receive the
intended benefit.
Understandable resistance has surfaced in scholarly debate with
respect to the application of criminal liability in light of various under-
cutting agency theories. Within a corporate entity, there are multiple lay-
ers of actors. To some, "[c]orporate crime generally is not conceived of
as a pervasive failure of organizations; it is a function of failed govern-
37. See Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and
Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & PoL'Y 1, 3 (2010); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 193, 213-15 (1991).
38. See LAUFER, supra note 6, at 11, 63-81.
39. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1489 (citation omitted). Note that this current approach to
liability assumes a corporation can possess mens rea, rejecting the Victorian tradition that a
corporation cannot possess such intent. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 843 (1927).
40. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1494-98.
41. See id. at 1489 (quoting Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1250 (1979)).
42. Id. at 1490.
43. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1490 (citations omitted).
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ance or failed leadership by officers and directors in a select few compa-
nies."" Where the reach of criminal law extends only to "those
individuals and organizations that demonstrate a certain willfulness,
recklessness, intention, purpose, or knowledge in committing a prohib-
ited act," 4  it seems officers and directors bear the majority, if not the
entirety, of the risk of criminal sanctions "for failures to make reasona-
ble efforts to implement policies and practices that prevent crime."4 6 In
sum, emerging complaints paint this construction of corporate liability
as both over and under inclusive; critics find that it fails to optimally
deter corporate misconduct.47
C. Punishment
It seems self-evident that corporate punishment cannot parallel
individual punishment. After all, corporate entities cannot be enclosed
behind prison bars. However, punitive sanctions, monetary or equitable,
can constitute criminal punishment.4 8 In the same ways that substantive
criminal law finds fodder for debating questions of whether a certain
punishment meets a crime, the effectiveness of punitive sanctions, recid-
ivism, etc., scholars debate the intersection of these familiar topics in the
realm of corporate criminal liability.4 9
44. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 74.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. at 57.
47. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); see also Baer, supra note 37, at 1
(citation omitted); LAUFER, supra note 6, at 70-72 (Laufer suggests a liability theory he refers to
as "constructive fault," which construes "facts, circumstances, conduct, and intentionality of an
organization, prompting a fair or reasonable attribution of liability." Id. Further,
Constructive fault assumes that corporations may be distinguished from individual
agents or aggregations of agents on the basis of their structure, decision making,
size, formality, functionality, and complexity. It also assumes that corporate
criminal liability should be reserved for crimes committed by agents whose actions
and intentions are related in ways that reflect features and attributes of the
organization, and agents whose relationship to the organization is such that their
actions are in the name of the firm and thus those of the organization. Evidence of
corporate criminal liability under a model of constructive fault may be found in
distinct aspects of the organization, such as policies, goals, and practices that reveal
more than the individual or collective nature of agents' intentions and actions.
Id. (citations omitted). Finally, Laufer writes that "[c]ulpable organizational action may be
identified through an objective test where it is determined that given the size, complexity,
formality, functionality, decision-making process, and structure of the corporate organization, it is
reasonable to conclude that the agents' acts are those of the corporation." Id. at 72.
48. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1487, 1497-1500.
49. See generally Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence,
Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1189-90 (1982); Regina A. Robson,
Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for Organizational Criminal
Liability, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 109, 111-12 (2010); Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why
442 [Vol. 66:435
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With the growth in the regulatory powers of the federal government
and its ordained enforcement agencies, many scholars question whether
corporate criminal liability is still "needed" to achieve the task of deter-
ring corporate misconduct.o Enforcement agencies, as sub-agents of the
executive branch, operate civilly to enforce specific statutes. Corpora-
tions found in violation of a statute are subject to an enforcement pro-
ceeding and subsequently the imposition of a fine or some other
penalty.5 ' Despite these numerous federal agencies, the Department of
Justice nonetheless resists relinquishment of its power to hold corporate
entities criminally liable. 52
Additionally, because of the difficulty and often incongruity in
assigning organizational liability, some scholars fear that imposing crim-
inal liability on corporations will appear more as "unpredictable 'hard
shoves'" rather than streamlined regulatory strategy. Standards of
proof are not reduced simply because the defendant is a corporation and
not an individual, which makes attributing intent, given the agency
dilemmas at issue, difficult.54 To the public, the few criminally prose-
cuted corporations stand out as instances of the government taking the
opportunity to make an example of corporate misconduct.55 Further still,
some argue that the negative publicity associated with an often public
trial results in more than what is necessary to deter corporate miscon-
duct. 6 In a sense, the negative reception of the company by the public
after criminal indictment smacks of excessiveness. By convicting a
corporation, the jury may in fact be destroying the livelihood, if not the
lives, of tens, hundreds, sometimes even thousands of people, and "it is
not clear that corporate criminal liability is the best way to influence
corporate behavior."5
Despite the various arguments raised against corporate criminal lia-
bility, significant public policy advantages remain. Especially when
viewed through the lens of the current ad hoc methodology of bank-
Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263
(1991).
50. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1521.
51. Wilson Meeks, Comment, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 77, 83 (2006).
52. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan.
20, 2003).
53. LAUFER, supra note 6, at 193.
54. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1512-17.
55. For an anecdotal example, see LAUFER, supra note 6, at 45-47.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1478.
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ruptcy trustees and federal prosecutors engaged in corporate fraud litiga-
tion, corporate criminal liability makes sense. At a minimum, it saves
time and money while maximizing victim recovery. On a broad scale, it
provides a cohesive strategy that more effectively deters corporate mis-
conduct in the first place. Either approach surely provides sufficient
public policy incentives that warrant the treatment of corporations as
individuals in order to subject them to criminal charges and punishment.
As this summary demonstrates, the debate over corporate criminal
liability is wrought with intertwined normative concerns and positive
realities. This piece endeavors to refocus the debate by casting some
normative quandaries aside, so as to focus on a situation that warrants
the use of corporate criminal liability. First, this piece recognizes corpo-
rate personhood as the critical building block for corporate criminal lia-
bility. Further, this piece limits its recommendation of corporate
criminal liability only to Rothstein-like scenarios (i.e., where a legiti-
mate business entity is utilized as a vehicle for an investment fraud
scheme, and thus becomes the criminal enterprise for purposes of prose-
cuting a principal of the entity). Finally, this article advocates for corpo-
rate criminal liability only to the extent that it cleanly coordinates the
U.S. Attorney's Office and the bankruptcy trustee in order to maximize
the recovery to victims; punishing the business entity is not the purpose,
nor, in Rothstein scenarios where involuntary bankruptcy is also on the
table, is it the outcome. To expand on this stance, the next section articu-
lates the specific statutory framework under criminal forfeiture law and
bankruptcy law, and then-using United States v. Rothstein as a case
study-demonstrates their unanticipated failure when both are applied to
the same case.
II. THE RoTHSTEIN MELTDOWN
In the past few years, corporate principals have one by one been
charged with criminal conduct perpetrated through the use of legitimate
businesses. Newspapers have fed details of investment fraud to the
news-hungry public, describing unfathomable amounts of money
invested and lost at the hands of corporate fraudsters.59 Because corpo-
rate fraud is often complicated, this section explains Scott Rothstein's
Ponzi scheme, its exposure, and the ensuing litigation. The Rothstein
case exemplifies a clash between bankruptcy and criminal litigation and
59. See Kevin McCoy, Recession Forces Unraveling Ponzi Schemes into the Open, USA
TODAY, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2009-04-17-markets-recession-
scheme-ponziN.htm; Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs, N.Y. TIM4ES, Jan. 28, 2009, at Bl;




illustrates the chaos that can result without coordination. In an effort to
clarify the complex litigation that erupted in the aftermath of the Roth-
stein scandal, this section also articulates how bankruptcy and criminal
forfeiture law function absent an investment fraud scheme perpetrated
through a legitimate business that entangles the two. In so doing, this
section builds upon the corporate criminal liability debate by detailing a
situation that falls at the crossroads of civil and criminal liability.
South Florida arrived on the national investment fraud scene with
the collapse of a Ponzi scheme60 perpetrated by the CEO and chairman
of the region's now-defunct law firm Rothstein, Rosenfeldt & Adler
("RRA"). 61 Beginning in 2006, Scott W. Rothstein went the way of Ber-
nard Madoff,62 Marc Dreier,63 and other notable investment fraudsters
by eliciting investors to buy non-existent, out-of-court structured settle-
ments relating to sexual harassment and whistle-blower cases. 64 As 2009
marched to an end, Rothstein's fraud crumbled until its ultimate collapse
in November of that year. When the dust settled, over $1.2 billion had
churned through the scheme.
From his position within the firm and with the help of his co-con-
spirators, Rothstein began soliciting clients and friends to invest in con-
fidential settlement agreements.6 6 Specifically, Rothstein represented to
potential investors that his firm was negotiating confidential settlement
agreements for sexual harassment and whistle-blower causes of action. 7
In order to secure the credibility of the investment opportunity, Roth-
stein infused his solicitation with false statements regarding the firm's
prestige and extensive client base. The talented lawyers employed cre-
ated the veneer of prestige with lavish expenditures," including law firm
parties and charity contributions.69
Rothstein maintained that RRA's internal controls solidified the
60. "A ponzi scheme is a scheme whereby a corporation operates and continues to operate at
a loss. The corporation gives the appearance of being profitable by obtaining new investors and
using those investments to pay for the high premiums promised to earlier investors." McHale v.
Huff (In re Huff), 109 B.R. 506, 512 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
61. Information at 1, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1,
2009), ECF No. 1.
62. Complaint at 1-2, United States v. Madoff, No. 08-MAG-2735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008).
63. Indictment at 1, United States v. Dreier, No. 09-CRIM-085 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2009),
ECF No. 11.
64. Information at 4, Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1.
65. Id. at 2-3.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 3-4.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Michael Mayo, A New Big Shot in Town: Lawyer Builds Powerful Finn, SUN SENTINEL,
Nov. 16, 2008, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-11-16/news/0811150310 1 law-firm-lawyer-
friend.
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security of the investments. The firm allegedly "rigorously screened" the
confidential settlement agreements and "utilized former law enforce-
ment personnel and employed highly sophisticated methods in selecting
and pursuing claims against purported defendants . . . ."1o The firm
would consult with the defendant company after the company was made
aware of the claim, and negotiate a payout to the claim holder; all nego-
tiation purportedly occurred with "no court or governmental" involve-
ment.7 1 The investment opportunities arose when the claimholders
turned down periodic payments and instead opted for a smaller lump
sum payout.72 Investors would supply the money for the lump sum
payouts, and then receive the returns from the purported defendant
payments."
To grease the wheels, Rothstein routinely informed investors that
RRA maintained trust accounts for each investor, and that the funds
were regularly verified by "independent verifiers."74 Further, funds were
allegedly kept in trust accounts in a reputable international bank from
which regular statements would be issued." All of these details compose
the underpinnings of an investment scheme that promised to double their
investment in six months. 6
In classic Ponzi scheme fashion, RRA's actual conduct with respect
to its investors' money fell exceedingly short of the promises offered to
investors. In fact, RRA began paying out the returns on its earlier inves-
tors' money with subsequent investors' initial investments. 7 Pressure
mounted, thanks to the economic downturn, and the "house of cards"
built by Rothstein came crashing down.78 The beginnings of Rothstein's
Ponzi scheme trace back to 2006, but it was not until the recession took
hold of the economy that his fraud was discovered.7 9 Following the col-
70. Information at 6-7, Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 7-8.
74. Id. at 8-9.
75. Id. In fact, investor funds were deposited into trust funds in the name of the firm; said
accounts, however, were a far cry from the individualized, monitored accounts Rothstein
described. Instead, the accounts were glorified slush funds containing mixed investor and non-
investor funds-a reality that plagued both the bankruptcy trustee and the Assistant U.S.
Attorneys attempting to fashion an equitable outcome despite the financial mess. See DE 90 from
USA v. Rothstein; see also John Pacenti, Rothstein Prosecutors Fear Attorney Fees May Bleed
Estate Dry, DAILY Bus. REV., July 2, 2010, at Al.
76. Michael Mayo, Do Investors in Ponzi Schemes Deserve Money Back? SUN SENTINEL,
Aug. 31, 2010, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-08-30/news/sfl-mike-mayo-rothstein-link-08
302010_1 rothstein-investors-law-firm-trust-accounts-scott-rothstein.
77. Information at 10, Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1.
78. See Joshua Marcus & Jake Greenberg, Ponzi Schemes: Washed Ashore by Recession's
Low Tide, Reveal Controversial Issues, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2010, at 48.
79. See Tonya Alanez, Lawyer's Scandal is a Windfall for Others, SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 5,
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lapse of the investment scheme came two simultaneous litigation efforts:
one headed by a federal bankruptcy trustee wading through the mire of
the defunct RRA, and the other headed by the Department of Justice
prosecuting Rothstein and collecting his assets.
As I will illustrate below, the uniqueness of Rothstein's fraud was
not the scheme itself; rather, it was the overlapping of the ensuing litiga-
tion in the criminal forfeiture and bankruptcy contexts. The following
two subsections look at the Rothstein litigation first as it would have
played out absent the simultaneous bankruptcy proceeding, and then as
it actually happened, to demonstrate how a lack of priority and coordina-
tion between the two enforcers nearly railroaded both efforts and ulti-
mately cost victims and creditors. What newspaper reporters in the
South Florida community dubbed the "Rothstein fallout" referring to the
exposure of the Ponzi scheme and the failure of his Fort Lauderdale law
firm, more aptly described the jurisdictional battles, the frustrated attor-
neys, the empty-handed creditors and victims, and the ever-ticking fee
meter that existed due to the lack of coordination." Much like the pre-
ceding case against lawyer Marc Dreier in New York, both proceedings
putatively sought the same outcome: to maximize the recovery of assets
for fraud victims." Each "ma[d]e claim to having some unique over-
arching power to accomplish this objective: Bankruptcy has the auto-
matic stay and orderly rules . . . and the forfeiture case provides the
government with powerful investigatory and asset seizure authority."82
A. The Best Laid Plans: Criminal Forfeiture & Rothstein
A criminal fraud case begins, as Rothstein's did, with the formal
charging of the defendant. In the charging document, either an informa-
tion (typically indicative of some type of plea arrangement or offer to
cooperate with the prosecution) or an actual indictment, a forfeiture alle-
gation will be included." Criminal forfeiture requires that the defendant
2009, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-12-05/news/0912040189_1rothstein-rosenfeldt-adler-
crininal-defense-non-equity-partner.
80. Peter Franceschina, Sally Kestin & Brittany Wallman, Rothstein Fallout Lands Far and
Wide, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 27, 2010, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-01-27/news/10012700
72 1_rothstein-rosenfeldt-adler-firm-co-owner-stuart-rosenfeldt-scott-rothstein.
81. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United
States Bankruptcy Court, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19,
2010), ECF No. 88; Government's Response in Opposition to Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's
Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United States Bankruptcy Court at 3, United States
v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2010), ECF No. 94.
82. Courtney J. Linn, Recovering Assets in Investment Fraud Cases, 45 CluM. L. BULL. 744,
747 (2009).
83. FED. R. CluM. P. 32.2(a). This statement raises the question of how the government
determines what property should be subject to forfeiture. In reality, the investigative agencies
working with the government would have begun their work long before a formal charge was
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be convicted of the related criminal offense. Because forfeiture is part
of the sentence, if the prosecution fails to prove the underlying criminal
conviction, the forfeiture also fails. In addition, the Government will
typically file a bill of particulars listing specific forfeitable assets found
after the filing of the charging document.' The next step would tradi-
tionally be conviction by way of trial or the guilty plea of the criminal
defendant." A conviction or a guilty plea is necessary for the forfeiture
proceeding, as only the assets related to the convicted crimes are eligible
for criminal forfeiture.8 8
With a guilty plea from the defendant to the criminal allegations or
a conviction from the jury as to both the criminal and forfeiture allega-
tions, the Government would compose its final list of forfeitable assets
and file a preliminary order of forfeiture with the corresponding district
court.8 9 The preliminary order would establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the assets named were one of three things: (1) pro-
ceeds of the charged crimes, (2) sufficiently involved in the commission
of those crimes, or (3) used to disguise the commission of those
crimes.9 0 The district court will review the forfeiture allegations and
determine whether the Government met its burden of providing an
essential nexus between the assets and the crime and if the facts are
sufficient to show that the forfeited assets were involved in the fraud."
If the district court agrees with the U.S. Attorney's Office and
issues the preliminary order of forfeiture, ancillary proceedings can then
commence.9 2 These ancillary proceedings are much like quiet title
lodged against the defendant. Prior investigation results in the bill of particulars subject to
forfeiture used in the charging document.
84. See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1387 n.11 (4th Cir. 1996) (vacating
forfeiture order because the convictions were vacated); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer, When Two
Worlds Collide: The Relationship and Conflicts Between Asset Forfeiture and Bankruptcy Law,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2002, at 10, 37 ("Criminal forfeiture is imposed as part of the sentence
on a convicted person." (citation omitted)).
85. See Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in the Assets, 18
REv. L. & Soc. JusT. 45 (2008).
86. DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 186 (2d ed. 2008) (citations omitted).
87. Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: 2007, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 461, 478-84
(2007).
88. EDGEWORTH, supra note 86, at 5, 191.
89. Id. at 194. The order is entered irrespective of any third-party claims, as those will be
resolved at the ancillary hearing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(2).
90. See Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal Forfeiture Procedure: An Analysis of Developments in
the Law Regarding the Inclusion of a Forfeiture Judgment in the Sentence Imposed in a Criminal
Case, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 70, 74 (2004).
91. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 86, at 13 ("The government is required to establish a nexus
between the property to be forfeited and the criminal violation.").
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A).
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actions to settle ownership of the forfeited assets with respect to third-
party claimants. 9 3 During an investigation preceding a criminal charge,
the prospective defendant's assets may be seized.94 Whether seized prior
to or in accordance with an indictment, the true ownership of assets
remains a question until the ancillary proceedings. 95 The ancillary pro-
ceedings exist to protect the rights of the true owners of the seized and
forfeited property. 96 Third-parties who claim an interest in the seized
property may file claims to that property at the ancillary proceedings.
Once the claim is filed, federal courts will look to the controlling state
law to determine the nature of the claimant's interest in the property and
then will apply federal forfeiture law.98
If the federal court is satisfied that the claimant has an interest in
the property, the court will then look to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) to deter-
mine if the individual has standing in federal court,99 and subsequently
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) to determine if the claimant prevails on the mer-
its."oo Under § 853(n)(2), the claimant must assert "a legal interest in the
property which has been forfeited to the United States," by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.' 0' In doing so, all of the usual constitutional prin-
ciples governing Article III standing apply.10 2 Specifically, a third-party
claimant in a criminal forfeiture case must show "actual or imminent
injury-not a hypothetical, conjectural, or abstract injury"-resulting
from the forfeiture of the property. 03 By successfully establishing an
interest in the property, the claimant will be awarded standing in the
federal forum.
Having established standing, the third-party claimant would then
proceed to the merits within the ancillary proceeding.'0 4 Section
853(n)(6) allows two distinct categories of claimants to prevail:10 5 only
"those whose legal interests in the property were superior to the defen-
dant at the time the interest of the United States vested through the com-
93. See Cassella, supra note 90, at 93.
94. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 86, at 186-90.
95. Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).
96. See United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 913 (11th Cir. 2001), superseded on other
grounds, United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he statute [18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(1) (2000)] was designed to protect only the property rights of innocent third-parties, not
those of the government.").
97. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)-(3) (2006).
98. EDGEWORTH, supra note 86, at 199 (citations omitted).
99. Cassella, supra note 87, at 505 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), (n)(6).
101. Cassella, supra note 87, at 505.
102. See United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. See Cassella, supra note 87, at 506.
105. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)-(B).
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mission of an act giving rise to forfeiture and bona fide purchasers for
value without knowledge of the forfeitability of the defendant's
assets."10 6 Pleading a superior right, title, and interest is narrower than it
sounds. Under forfeiture law, the government's interest in the forfeitable
property vests at the time the offense occurs, not when the offense is
discovered or charged or when the property is seized."1' In order to pre-
vail in an ancillary proceeding, therefore, the claimant must show that he
or she had superior title to the defendant at the time of the offense.os
Bona fide purchasers must simply prove that they purchased the ulti-
mately forfeited property without any knowledge that it was related to
criminal offenses and have a legal interest in the property.109
The claimants, having established one of these two legal bases,
would be returned title to the property. In more basic criminal offenses
where the forfeited property is personal or real property belonging to a
claimant, the title to that property is simply returned to the rightful
owner."' 0 Typically in investment fraud schemes, however, things are
more complicated. There are usually fewer assets to hand out than
claimants petitioning return of property."' With insufficient assets to
fully restitute victims, courts then have to decide the percentage victims
are entitled to receive. 1 2 A victim's recovery can be greatly influenced
by when the victim invested in the scheme and the extent of his or her
respective losses.1 1 3
Ultimately, the U.S. Attorney's Office operates in pursuit of strict
goals when handling fraud. Punishment of the fraudster is a top priority,
but in more recent years, so is restituting the victims. The job once left
to the civil arena now represents an important and successful objective.
More importantly, federal prosecutors endeavor to manage this new pri-
ority in the most cost-effective manner, utilizing the many agency-
related resources available to do so. 114
106. See Cassella, supra note 87, at 507 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 495 (citation omitted).
108. United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
109. Cassella, supra note 87, at 510-11 (citation omitted).
110. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629 (1989) ("[T]he
statute [21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)] permits 'rightful owners' of forfeited assets to make claims for
forfeited assets before they are retained by the Government.").
111. "On average, the government collects about four to seven cents of [every] dollar of
criminal debt. Of the total criminal debt owed, two-thirds of it consists of restitution debt owed in
fraud cases." Linn, supra note 82, at 745 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 744-754.
113. See generally Karen E. Nelson, Turning Winners into Losers: Ponzi Scheme Avoidance
Law and the Inequity of Clawbacks, 95 MIN. L. Rav. 1456 (2011).




On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a wholly sep-
arate framework for effectuating a similar purpose: collecting assets of a
defunct business enterprise and redistributing their value to properly
claiming creditors. As it currently stands, Title 11 of the United States
Code ("Bankruptcy Code") is fashioned to provide eligible debtors (both
individuals and business entities) the opportunity to restart financially
through reorganization or liquidation. To commence a case under bank-
ruptcy, a petition, voluntary or involuntary, must be filed.I" As a matter
of law, the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate
comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case,"H 6 and the statutory automatic stay
becomes effective.' '"
With the legal creation of the bankruptcy estate, managerial author-
ity of the estate must be established. The bankruptcy court where the
petition was initially filed will either appoint a bankruptcy trustee or, in
certain circumstances pertaining to reorganization, a debtor-in-posses-
sion."s Throughout the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, whether
they be exemption proceedings or the development of a reorganization
plan, either the trustee or the debtor-in-possession will represent the
debtor." 9 Depending on the complexity of the estate, the trustee will be
responsible for maintaining all aspects of the estate while proceedings
are pending. In the case of the trustee, fees are paid from the pool of
assets acquired in either a reorganization or a liquidation proceeding.120
During the administration of the estate, the automatic stay serves an
invaluable function. Essentially injunctive relief protecting both the
debtor and the creditors as a whole, the automatic stay limits individual
creditor actions against the estate for the duration of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.12' The automatic stay allows the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-
in-possession time to develop a way of resolving the financial affairs of
the debtor. 122 In the winding up or reorganization of the debtor's finan-
cial affairs, the automatic stay ensures that creditors are treated equally
115. FED. R. BANIR. P. 1002.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
117. Id. § 362(a).
118. Id. §§ 701-703.
119. Id. § 1107(a).
120. Phillip L. Kunkel, Jeffrey A. Peterson & Jessica A. Mitchell, Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Liquidations, UNIV. MINN. EXTENSION (2009), http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/
businessmanagement/df/7295.html.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(3).
122. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUpTcy 14 (4th ed. 2006); Michael L. Cook &
Jessica L. Fainman, The Bankruptcy Code's Automatic Stay, in 29TH ANNUAL CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRupTcy & REORGANIZATION 661 (2007).
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rather than permitting a race to file against the debtor, which would ben-
efit the single creditor to the disadvantage of other creditors. 123 Despite
the breadth of application of the automatic stay, it does not stop collec-
tion of alimony, child support payments, or the commencement or con-
tinuation of criminal proceedings against the debtor. 124
To ensure repayment of debts and obligations, creditors must take
certain actions. Indeed, timely preparation and filing of a proof of claim
establishes the nature of the claim, whether secured or unsecured, and
the amount.125 A claimant's establishment of secured status is significant
because it will greatly affect the extent of repayment. Creditors are pri-
oritized based on the secured or unsecured status of their claims; secured
creditors receive repayment before unsecured creditors.' 26 When all
assets are accounted for and the time for settling debts arrives, secured
creditors will likely receive closer to the total amount of the debt owed
in repayment and unsecured creditors will only receive a percentage of
the debt repayment.127
The bankruptcy estate is actually larger than the statutory language
suggests. In addition to all the legal and equitable interests of the debtor
at the commencement of the proceeding, the bankruptcy estate can
expand to include all assets fraudulently transferred. 128 Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, any assets transferred within ninety days of a bankruptcy
filing are automatically subject to the trustee's fraudulent transfer pow-
ers-denoted in the trade as "clawbacks."l 29 Further, any preferential
transfers made to friends, family members, or business associates prior
to the filing of bankruptcy are also subject to the clawback power.130 In
practice, trustees can significantly expand the size of the asset pool
through the use of the clawback power.'
Trustee fees remain the single most important element within the
statutory framework for bankruptcy. 3 2 The Bankruptcy Code provides a
123. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 174, 340 (1977).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)-(C). This paper concerns the exemption to the automatic stay
that arises in the context of criminal proceedings. Conceivably, under the Bankruptcy Code,
federal prosecutors could choose to indict a corporate entity at almost any stage of the bankruptcy
case and effectively halt its continuation. The effect of a given criminal action would depend on
the nature of assets involved and the amount subject to criminal forfeiture.
125. Id. § 501.
126. Emp'rs Ins. of Wasau v. Ramette (In re HLM Corp.), 183 B.R. 852, 854 (D. Minn. 1994).
127. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era
of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REv. 368, 397-403
(2009).
128. Nelson, supra note 113, at 1459.
129. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548.
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statutory entitlement for fees for the bankruptcy trustee and any attor-
neys or accountants he or she may hire to assist in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.133 To ensure payment of fees, priority is given to the trustee to
collect his or her fees first. Prior to distributing any assets to deserving
creditors, the bankruptcy trustee will be paid, with approval by the bank-
ruptcy court, his or her fees.' 34 Fees include the attorneys and account-
ant fees all totaled by multiplying the hourly rate by the amount of
hours; fees must be approved by the court as reasonable.1 35
Once the entire bankruptcy estate is accumulated and reduced by
the fee, the trustee will then distribute assets. As described above, the
status of each creditor's claim is of maximum importance. Often, a
defunct business has fewer assets on its balance sheet than debts owed to
creditors. Secured creditors can worry less because their claims will be
paid first with the existing assets.'3 6 Meanwhile, unsecured creditors
must wait with fingers crossed in hopes that there will be enough left
over.13 7 In order to provide some level of protection for their claims,
many times creditors develop "committees" which hire lawyers to advo-
cate for their claims.' 3 8
Although numerous means exist through which a debtor may pro-
ceed through the bankruptcy process, these steps are generalized and
will pertain to most all debtors and creditors. This short recitation also
makes clear that a broad statutory framework exists to handle financial
failures of individuals and entities. 13 When aligned with the criminal
forfeiture framework, certain parities arise while at the same time one
may note distinctions. Given the incentives and drawbacks, coordination
is even more important. Reviewing the Rothstein case study further
illustrates the need for alignment of both processes.
C. Two Worlds Colliding: United States v. Rothstein
In United States v. Rothstein, the statutorily proscribed process did
not transpire according to plan. Instead, a simultaneous bankruptcy pro-
ceeding began involuntarily against Scott Rothstein's firm at function-
ally the same time that the government began its case against Rothstein.
Unlike other fraud cases, Rothstein's Ponzi scheme took the federal
prosecutors by surprise; instead of building a strong case through inves-
133. Id. §§ 326-328.
134. Id. § 507(a)(1)(C).
135. Id. §§ 326, 330.
136. Id. § 724; Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-
Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287 (2003).
137. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507.
138. See, e.g., In re Advisory Comm. of Major Funding Corp., 109 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1997).
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 109.
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tigation, the initial steps in the prosecution were purely reactive. In the
bankruptcy world, with the filing of the involuntary petition of bank-
ruptcy against Rothstein, Rosenfeldt & Adler, the quickly appointed
trustee began to arrange the bankruptcy estate. 140 Much to his chagrin,
however, many of the assets that would otherwise be under his control
or at least subject to the automatic stay were seized by the Government
and inaccessible."' As will be demonstrated by the forthcoming recon-
struction of both the district court and the bankruptcy dockets, the bank-
ruptcy trustee exercised his powers under the Bankruptcy Code and
attempted at every possible opportunity to bring the seized assets in the
possession of the federal government within the bankruptcy estate of
Rothstein, Rosenfeldt & Adler.14 2 As the reconstruction of the major
points in the litigation should demonstrate, the Rothstein meltdown illus-
trates a stark need for coordination between the federal prosecutor's
office and bankruptcy trustees involved in the aftermath of financial
frauds. Further, this coordination serves the interest of public policy in
and of itself while also protecting both creditors and victims, whose
interests seemed a sideshow during the Rothstein litigation.
Litigation began on November 10, 2009, prior to Rothstein's appre-
hension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, when four creditors filed
a Chapter 11 Involuntary Petition for Bankruptcy against alleged debtor
Rothstein, Rosenfeldt & Adler.143 Ten days later, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida appointed Herbert
Stettin to serve as trustee.'44
The United States filed formal charges against Rothstein, by way of
Information, on December 1, 2009, alleging racketeering, money laun-
dering conspiracy, mail and wire fraud conspiracy, and wire fraud.14 5
Count I (Racketeering) of the criminal Information, named RRA the
criminal enterprise through which the defendant, Scott Rothstein, con-
ducted his alleged racketeering.'4 6 Rothstein's means of engaging in
criminal racketeering are listed at length, and include distributing "lavish
140. See Paula McMahon, Jon Burstein & Sally Kestin, Rothstein Gives Up Homes, Businesses
to Government, SUN SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 2009, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-12-04/news/09
12030367_1_scott-rothstein-rothstein-rosenfeldt-adler-ponzi-scheme.
141. Peter Franceschina, Battle Over Rothstein's Assets Goes to Court Monday, SUN SENTINEL,
Aug. 29, 2010, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-08-29/news/fl-rothstein-forfeiture-hearing-
20100829_1_rothstein-rosenfeldt-adler-law-ponzi-schemer-scott-rothstein-clawback-suits.
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 361-366.
143. Involuntary Petition, In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., No. 09-34791-RBR (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2009), ECF No. 1.
144. Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee and Setting of Bond, In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt
Adler, P.A., No. 09-34791-RBR (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2009), ECF No. 35.
145. See United States v. Various Real Props., No. 0:09-cv-61780-WJZ (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9,
2009).
146. Id. at 2.
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gifts including exotic cars, jewelry, boats, loans, cash and bonuses to
individuals and members of RRA in order to engender goodwill and
loyalty and to create the appearance of a successful law firm,""' and
utiliz[ing] funds obtained through the "Ponzi" scheme to supplement
and support the operation and activities of RRA, to expand RRA by
the hiring of additional attorneys and support staff, to fund salaries
and bonuses, and to acquire larger and more elaborate office space
and equipment in order to enrich the personal wealth of persons
employed by and associated with the Enterprise.14 8
In addition, Count II (Money Laundering Conspiracy) alleged that Roth-
stein and RRA had thirty-eight accounts at TD Bank, N.A. and at least
four other accounts at Gibraltar Private Bank and Trust.149 The last three
counts, one of mail fraud combined with wire fraud and two of wire
fraud particularly, involved only the defendant. 5 o
In addition to the criminal allegations, the Information contained an
allegation of criminal forfeiture that attached due to the nature of the
criminal charges.' 5 1 The federal statutes tied to the five counts within the
Information provide for forfeiture of any interest or proceeds gained
from the commission of the crimes. 5 2 In addition to the allegation of
forfeiture, the Government provided a bill of particulars detailing the
property subject to forfeiture, which included, "a sum of money equal to
[$1.2 billion] in United States currency" as well as a list of real proper-
ties, vehicles, vessels, tangibles, bank accounts, and business inter-
ests.' The bill of particulars lists all the assets that were allegedly
purchased or otherwise acquired through the proceeds of Rothstein's
fraud or attempts to hide the fraud as a legitimate business.' 54 The trust
accounts are of particular importance because traditionally a bankrupt
entity's bank accounts are unquestionably part of the bankruptcy
estate.' 55 In this case, the accounts were used to funnel money for Roth-
stein's fraud as well as to hide the fact that a fraud was going on at
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 11.
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 15-17.
151. Id. at 17.
152. Under criminal forfeiture law, the criminal defendant must be convicted of a criminal act
in violation of a statute that allows for forfeiture upon conviction. See Information at 17-19,
United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1; Stefan D. Cassella, Criminal
Forfeiture Procedure in 2008: An Annual Survey of Developments in the Case Law, 44 CRIM. L.
BULL., Summer 2008.
153. Information at 19-34, Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1.
154. Id. at 17-18.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
2012] 455
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
all.'"' The bank accounts serve as an integral part of the battle between
the trustee and the U.S. Attorney's Office since a large number of funds
were maintained there.
On December 6, 2009, the U.S. Attorney's Office filed for a protec-
tive order requesting that the district court grant the federal government
the exclusive role of seizing and maintaining Rothstein's assets involved
in the fraud, including the RRA trust accounts through which Rothstein
funneled investor funds and extracted funds for his own enjoyment.15 7
The court granted the motion on December 7, 2009,158 causing exasper-
ated cries from attorneys working in the concurrent bankruptcy
proceeding.1 59
Barely a week later, the bankruptcy trustee filed a Motion to Mod-
ify Protective Order and Authorize the United States Marshals Service to
Turnover 8 RRA Bank Accounts.1 60 Citing requests by previous clients
and employees of the firm, the trustee assumed the stance that "[g]iven
the complex task involved in dismantling a sophisticated Ponzi scheme
involving an operating law firm . . . the bankruptcy system is best
equipped to marshal the debtor's assets and to resolve competing claims
to the same properties."' 6 1 This motion began the battle over control of
the assets, particularly RRA trust accounts, and power to distribute those
assets to those who claimed entitlement to them. 162 The district court
denied the trustee's motion on the grounds that it was premature, sug-
gesting that the latter may yet file a claim under the 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(k)-which requires ancillary proceedings.163
Less than two months following the filing of the Information, Roth-
stein pled guilty.'" In paragraph six of his plea agreement, it states:
156. Information at 3, Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1; Plea Agreement at 1,
United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2010), ECF No. 69.
157. Government's Ex Parte Motion and Memorandum of Law for Post-Information Protective
Order at 1, 7-8, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2009),
ECF No. 12.
158. Protective Order at 2-3, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 7, 2009), ECF No. 13.
159. Jordana Mishory, Feds Get First Dibs on Lawyer's Seized Property, DAILY Bus. REV.,
Dec. 8, 2009, at A3.
160. Process Receipt & Return at 1, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2010), ECF No. 17.
161. Chapter II Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United
States Bankruptcy Court, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19,
2010), ECF No. 88.
162. See Marcus & Greenberg, supra note 78.
163. Order Denying Without Prejudice Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to Modify Protective
Order and to Authorize Turnover of Eight Accounts at 3, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-
60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2010), ECF No. 25.
164. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Jan.
27, 2010), ECF No. 69.
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The defendant further understands and acknowledges that, in addition
to any sentence imposed under paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this agree-
ment, forfeiture may be imposed as part of that sentence. The defen-
dant agrees to the forfeiture of all of his right, title and interest to all
assets listed in the Information and listed in the Bill of Particulars,
and/or their substitutes (hereinafter "the assets"), whether controlled
individually or through defendant's wholly owned or partially owned
corporations or third-parties, which are subject to forfeiture pursuant
to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1963, 982(a)(1) and/or
981(a)(1)(C). 165
Since "[c]riminal forfeitures are in personam judgmentsl6 6 . . . there
must be a conviction for a criminal offense before there can be a forfei-
ture based on that offense."1 67 Rothstein's guilty plea replaced a convic-
tion and allowed the federal prosecutors to move forward with the
forfeiture action.
On February 19, 2010, the Trustee filed a Motion to Refer All
Third Party Claims to the Bankruptcy Court. 168 Paying lip service to the
shared goals of
(1) maximizing the value of all assets, both those seized by the gov-
ernment and those currently part of the Debtor's estate; (2) maximiz-
ing the distribution to all investor victims of Rothstein's crimes,
which victims are likely to comprise the overwhelming majority of
the creditors of the Debtor's estate; and (3) making such distributions
as efficiently and expeditiously as possible1 69
the trustee argued that "the Bankruptcy Code offers a principled, effi-
cient and equitable means of preserving the investors' claims to restitu-
tion without ignoring the legitimate rights of other non-investor
creditors."O Unwilling to agree, the Government responded by empha-
sizing that "the District Court is bound by the confines of federal crimi-
nal law, specifically the provisions dealing with criminal forfeiture and
restitution,""' and challenged the Bankruptcy Code with its own "clear,
165. Id. at 3. By agreeing to the forfeiture allegations, the defendant agrees to the forfeiture of
his property as part of his sentence, which renders unnecessary the trial the defendant would have
been entitled to under Rule 32.2(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1); Cassella, supra note 87, at 478-79.
166. Cassella, supra note 77, at 461 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 462 (citing STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
476 (2007)).
168. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United
States Bankruptcy Court at 1, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb.
19, 2010), ECF No. 88.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 10.
171. Government's Response in Opposition to Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to
Refer All Third Party Claims to the United States Bankruptcy Court at 3, United States v.
Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2010), ECF No. 94.
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streamlined, statutory framework for the issuance and enforcement of a
restitution order that affords due process to third party claimants." 172
Ultimately, the district court sided with the Government. 7 3
Simultaneous with the Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims, the
trustee proposed a joint status conference in light of the "fundamental
conflicts over the best manner to proceed to achieve [the] common
goals" 174 he shared with the Government. Relying in part on the actions
of the district court in United States v. Dreier,175 a parallel New York
case in both fact and law which issued a coordination agreement requir-
ing cooperation between the trustee and the Government, the trustee
advanced that a joint status conference would settle that "tension . . .
created as a result of the role of the government in seeking to obtain the
criminal forfeiture of properties belonging to Scott Rothstein and the
efforts of the Trustee to marshal all assets to which RRA may have legal
or equitable claims."1 76 Due to the "substantial complex legal and logis-
tical issues" that had yet to be "deliberated and resolved to ensure that
the United States" fulfilled "its mandate under The Justice for All Act of
2004," namely to determine whether forfeiture or restitution would be
appropriate for the victims, the Government opposed the trustee's
motion.'7 7 Despite the trustee raising the point in his Reply that the true
cost of the government's position was the continued depreciation of the
seized assets,17 1 the court sided with the Government."17
After the court's entrance of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, 1s0
the trustee again entered the jurisdictional thicket, this time with a
Motion to Amend a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture and Return of RRA
Bank Accounts, arguing forfeiture language in the district court and
alleging that the Government had not met the essential nexus required
172. Id. at 9.
173. Order Denying Motion for Referral of Third Party Claims and Order Denying Motion for
Joint Status Conference at 5, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Mar.
16, 2010), ECF No. 99.
174. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion for Joint Status Conference at 1, United States
v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 89.
175. No. 09-CRIM-085 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2009), ECF 11.
176. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion for Joint Status Conference at 1-2, Rothstein,
No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, ECF No. 1.
177. Government's Response in Opposition to Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion for
Joint Status Conference at 3, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-6033 1-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Mar.
8, 2010), ECF No. 95.
178. Chapter 11 Trustee's Reply to Government's Response in Opposition to Trustee's Motion
for Joint Status Conference [D.E.95] at 4, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010), ECF No. 98.
179. United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, 2010 WL 966647, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26,
2010).
180. DE 134 on 4/19/2010 of United States v. Rothstein.
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under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)."1 The court convicted Rothstein on the
grounds that the Government could not
distinguish the Ponzi-investor funds from funds deposited into RRA
accounts by the law firm's clients, and therefore the government can-
not trace all of the funds in the RRA accounts to criminal proceeds;
... the non-investor funds were not used to conceal or disguise the
investor funds; and . .. the funds in the RRA accounts were not used
to promote the underlying fraud.182
The trustee countered the court's finding of a nexus between the fraud
and the monies located in RRA accounts and demanded that those
accounts be turned over to the trustee."' From the Government's stand-
point, the trustee attempted to "relitigate the forfeitablity of property"18 4
and lacked the standing as a third party attempting to challenge forfei-
ture at an improper time, i.e., after a preliminary order of forfeiture,
rather than doing so during the statutorily proscribed ancillary proceed-
ings."' In its Order, the court stated that because "the statutory frame-
work provides for ancillary proceedings, the Court finds that the Trustee
has not been deprived of an opportunity to assert its right to forfeited
property."1 86 The court thereby ruled that the amendment was "outside
the statutory mechanism"'"' and further held, with respect to the RRA
accounts, that the trustee failed to show "that he lacks an adequate rem-
edy at law" because "[t]he Court, in the ancillary proceeding, will adju-
dicate the validity of the Trustee's alleged interest in the RRA
Accounts." 88
Finally, just prior to Rothstein's sentencing, the trustee filed his
Verified Claims and Petition for Adjudication of Interest, pertaining to
the majority of forfeited property listed in the Preliminary Order of For-
feiture as a final attempt to corral Rothstein's assets into bankruptcy
court.' 89 Relying on forfeiture language, the trustee argued that, as
181. Trustee's Response in Opposition to Adlers' Motion to Enforce Protective Order[D.E.
108 & 109] at 2, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2010),
ECF No. 135.
182. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Amend Preliminary Order of Forfeiture & for
Return of RRA Bank Accounts at 7, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D.
Fla. May 17, 2010), ECF No. 186.
183. Government's Response in Opposition to Chapter I1 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to
Amend Preliminary Order of Forfeiture and for Return of RRA Bank Accounts at 2, United States
v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2010), ECF No. 218.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. at 1.
186. United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN, 2010 WL 2351466, at *1-2 (S.D.
Fla. June 11, 2010) (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id.
189. DE 290 on 6/9/10 of United States v. Rothstein.
4592012]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
administrator of the bankruptcy estate, he maintained a superior interest
in the bank accounts titled to RRA, is a bona fide purchaser for value of
the real properties, and had a superior legal interest as a beneficiary of a
constructive trust as to all other forfeited assets.1 90 Unraveling the
assumptions underlying the trustee's argument, the Government con-
tended that the trustee failed to establish a legal interest in the funds
within the specific bank accounts and failed to show that the monies
were derived from legitimate business operations by a preponderance of
the evidence, as required by Eleventh Circuit interpretations of criminal
forfeiture law.191 The Government addressed the ever-present threat of a
court-imposed constructive trust1 92 under Georgia law by attempting to
demonstrate how the trustee's failure to trace creditor funds in the bank
accounts coupled with the existing remedy in the ancillary proceedings
eliminates any applicability of constructive trust law.' 93 The district
court agreed that the trustee has a legal interest in the accounts and fur-
ther identifies that the trustee has a legal interest sufficient to bear impo-
sition of a constructive trust, but since the trustee failed to allege or
adequately plead that investors can trace their money, the court did not
to impose one.194 With this final order from the district court, the Gov-
ernment was given permission to restitute victims through its own statu-
tory framework and the bankruptcy trustee was left with the assets
wholly uninvolved with the fraud along with his clawback powers to pay
back remaining creditors.
Ultimately, the court's order meant the Government succeeded in
its forfeiture of assets. 195 Following the final order of forfeiture, the
Government proceeded to restitution.1 96 The court modified the judg-
ment to reflect the restitution to be paid to qualifying victims. 197 The
trustee continues and will continue to pursue clawback suits against indi-
190. Chapter 11 Trustee's Verified Claims & Petition for Adjudication of Interests at 3-4, 7-8,
United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2010), ECF No. 192.
191. United States' Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Trustee's Verified Claims and Petition at 8,
10, 12, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2010), ECF No.
310. The Government purported that this analysis also disposed of the issue of whether the trustee
was a bona fide purchaser for value of the real properties because under forfeiture law, 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n)(2), petitioner must first establish a legal interest, which the trustee failed to do. Id. at 8.
192. "An equitable remedy that a court imposes against one who has obtained property by
wrongdoing. A constructive trust, imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, creates no fiduciary
relationship. Despite its name, it is not a trust at all." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1649 (9th ed.
2009). See also United States v. Ramunno, 599 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
193. United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR, slip op. at 4, 5 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2010).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Government's Final Report as to Restitution at 1, United States v. Rothstein, 09-60331-
CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010), ECF No. 589.
197. Amended Order Modifying Preliminary Order of Forfeiture to Describe Funds Once Held
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viduals who, under the Bankruptcy Code, improperly received funds
from the debtor prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding.198
Despite formal resolution of the dispute between the Government and
the trustee, no definitive answer as to how to handle this intersection
exists.L99 Were a similar case to appear again, the same frustrations
would likely arise because, after the plethora of motions were filed, a
proper procedure failed to be established. In light of the continuous
exposure of fraud schemes and the Department of Justice's commitment
to engaging in the marshaling and distribution of assets to victims, a
Rothstein scenario will likely arise again-in fact, it is only a matter of
time. Without a major financial fraud on the horizon, now is the time to
develop a protocol and synthesize an approach on how to handle fraud
schemes where the perpetrator is also the principal of an operating busi-
ness entity.
III. STRIVING FOR COORDINATION
What came to pass in the overlapping Rothstein litigation serves as
an illustration of how two enforcers at cross-purposes can limit, if not
extinguish, each other's effectiveness. As the discussion of criminal for-
feiture and bankruptcy law each illustrate, sustainable justifications for
affirmations of jurisdictional propriety and priority exist for both the
federal government and the bankruptcy trustee.2 00 In light of the provi-
sions in each statutory framework, which allowed for the Rothstein liti-
gation's jurisdictional standoff, one must consider other legal
alternatives to avoid that same situation from occurring in the future. I
propose that federal prosecutors more seriously consider the avenue of
corporate indictment. Not disregarding the difficult reality of corporate
prosecutions, criminal charges against the entity in complex fraud cases
cannot only streamline litigation and avoid the dual-purpose 20 1 clash
by Gibraltar Bank, United States v. Rothstein, 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2010),
ECF No. 593.
198. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (2006).
199. See Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the "Clawback"
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEx. B.J. 922 (2009); Garretson, supra note 85;
Gaumer, supra note 84, at 10, 36; Linn, supra note 82, at 744, 746; Clarence L. Pozza, Jr.,
Thomas R. Cox, Robert J. Morad, A Review of Recent Investor Issues in the Madoff Stanford and
Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 113 (2010).
200. "The scenarios for encountering forfeiture in a bankruptcy case are virtually endless."
Myron M. Sheinfeld, Teresa L. Maines & Mark W. Wege, Civil Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The
Conflicting Interest of the Debtor, Its Creditors and the Government, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 87
(1995).
201. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion for Joint Status Conference at 1, United States
v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 89. The ultimate cause
of the clash between the bankruptcy trustee and the federal prosecutors stems from the fact that
RRA operated as both a legitimate business and a guise of the underlying fraud. See Information
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evidenced in Rothstein, but they can also be a useful tool in maximizing
recovery to victims and creditors alike. There are a number of factors
established from an evidentiary standpoint in order to pursue corporate
prosecution.202 In the repertoire of tools the U.S. Attorney's Offices pos-
sess, corporate prosecution is among the most useful, but is of limited
use. The threat of corporate prosecution wields significant power;203
therefore, it should be strongly considered as a means of coordinating
and managing the logistical, procedural, and policy challenges concur-
rent bankruptcy and criminal litigation of corporate fraud schemes.20
Heeding reasoning on either side of the jurisdictional tug-of-war,
the extensive motion practice elucidates that both criminal forfeiture law
and bankruptcy possess unique attributes within their respective statu-
tory frameworks. Under criminal forfeiture, the federal government
maintains authority to marshal assets through various law enforcement-
related agencies in a manner that exceeds the powers of the bankruptcy
trustee. 20 5 Distribution of forfeited assets can follow any of a variety of
prescribed statutory, cost-effective frameworks. 206 Further, government-
run marshaling, organization, and distribution of assets subtracts nothing
from the overall recovery to victims. 207 An arguable downfall, raised by
the trustee during the Rothstein litigation, is the inexperience govern-
ment attorneys have in maintaining business enterprises and related
assets such to limit depreciation of their value to the maximum extent
possible. 208 Apart from the criminal forfeiture framework, "[i]n order to
achieve an equitable distribution to creditors, bankruptcy law gives the
at 1, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2009), ECF No. 1;
don't have access to ECF 127.
202. See Thompson, supra note 52.
203. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1497-1512.
204. Linn, supra note 82.
205. Jason S. Brookner et al., On a Collision Course: Ponzi Schemes, Bankruptcy,
Receiverships and Forfeitures, AM. BANat. INST., 357 (2009); Linn, supra note 82, at 747-51.
206. Once the government has successfully forfeited the assets of a fraudster, and
reduced those assets to a liquid form, it has two avenues for returning the assets to
the fraud victims. In most cases, the Justice Department returns the forfeited assets
to the underlying victim of the offense through the Attorney General's equitable
remission authority. In other cases, it turns the forfeited assets over to the district
court handling the underlying criminal matter for distribution through the restitution
process. In October 2002, the Attorney General issued a policy directive on
restoration, which delegated to the Chief of Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section (AFMLS) authority to restore property to victims. Under the new
procedures, the government may forfeit a defendant's property and apply the
forfeited property directly to an order of restitution.
Linn, supra note 82, at 749 (citations omitted).
207. Id.
208. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United
States Bankruptcy Court at 12, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 88.
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Trustee the power to recover certain assets transferred prior to the bank-
ruptcy to ensure equality of treatment." 209  These "clawback suits,"
where the bankruptcy trustee sues individuals and entities who receive
transfers from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy, are a tool unavailable
to the federal government in criminal forfeiture and increase overall
recovery to victims. 2 10 Yet, as emphasized by the Government 2 11 any
fees212 accrued by the bankruptcy trustee and his team of lawyers and
accountants will cost the victims (more likely than creditors), 2 13 and in a
case of significant legal complexity, it will cost them handsomely.2 14
Indictment of the corporate entity, in cases like that of Rothstein,
Rosenfeld & Adler, serves to coordinate the federal prosecutor and the
bankruptcy trustee while preserving their respective unique attributes. A
federal indictment operates as a stay (regardless of whether a corre-
sponding bankruptcy proceeding has been filed);2 15 it does not divest a
bankruptcy court of ultimate authority to administer the estate at the
appropriate time. Contrary to that notion, the indictment would permit
the federal government to marshal significant assets, relying on law
enforcement agencies and the leniency in forfeiture law to do so,21 6 pro-
ceed to forfeit those assets, and ultimately distribute them.217 However,
once the Government has exhausted these remedies-with district court
209. Id. at 9.
210. See Nelson, supra note 113.
211. Government's Response in Opposition to Chapter II Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to
Refer All Third Party Claims to the United States Bankruptcy Court at 4-5, United States v.
Rothstein, 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2010), ECF No. 94 (footnote omitted).
212. 11 U.S.C. §§ 326, 330.
213. Bankruptcy trustees attempt to maximize the assets of the estate for all creditors,
not just victims, according to the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules. Distributions
under federal forfeiture statutes and civil penalty statutes tend to favor victims over
other creditors. In contrast, in a bankruptcy proceeding, victims may have to elbow
for scarce assets alongside other creditors of the defendant. Some of those creditors
may have a preferred status; they may be secured creditors or creditors who have a
preference because under bankruptcy and commercial law they perfected their claim
against the debtor-defendant before the victims perfected their claims. Bankruptcy
proceedings may also tend to favor those victims who have the wit, vigor and
financial resources to retain counsel and press their claims vigorously at the expense
of victims who do not.
Linn, supra note 82, at 757 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 758.
215. "The automatic stay does not affect 'the commencement or continuation of a criminal
action or proceeding.'" Id. at 744, 756-57 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)).
216. "In a criminal forfeiture case, a court may issue a warrant for the seizure of property
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(f). To obtain such a warrant, the Government must have probable
cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture" (footnote omitted). Cassella, supra note
87, at 465.
217. "Forfeiture allows the government to seize or restrain the property acquired with fraud
proceeds before trial, dispose of any third party claims, reduce real and personal property to a
liquid form, and then remit or restore the forfeited proceeds to the victims of the underlying fraud
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approval-any remaining assets can be transferred to the trustee 2 18 to
distribute the influx of forfeited assets in combination with assets
acquired by the bankruptcy trustee to any remaining creditors.
The uniqueness of this response is its simplicity. As certain Depart-
ment of Justice statistics tend to indicate,219 the federal government is
not going to stand for financial fraud. Indeed, with President Obama's
reification of what once was the Corporate Fraud Task Force under the
Bush administration, now renamed Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force, the investigation and prosecution of financial and investment
fraud is a primary concern.2 20 Though the federal government intends to
investigate and prosecute financial fraud, its complexity coupled with
the intricate legal maze that follows in a prosecution (or as some other
scholars have suggested enforcement actions or equity receiverships) 221
that ultimately collides with a bankruptcy proceeding, renders the task
daunting. In attempting to achieve its continued objective, the federal
government through its prosecutorial offices should consider simple and
effective ways of streamlining their efforts. Including a meaningful con-
sideration of corporate criminal liability, when concurrent bankruptcy
and criminal litigation exists, is an opportunity to facilitate the federal
prosecutors' ability to crack down on white-collar crime, like financial
or investment fraud. Maximized distribution to victims of the fraud and
creditors of the entity is a significant byproduct of streamlining litigation
efforts in corporate fraud litigation that enhances the potential utility of
corporate criminal liability. The legal viability, equitable outcomes, and
practical applicability of this suggested approach are discussed below to
further encourage U.S. Attorney's Office to consider corporate criminal
liability as a matter of practice.
offense." Linn, supra note 82, at 748 (citing United States v. 730 Glen-Mady Way, 590 F. Supp.
2d 1295 (E.D. Cal. 2008)).
218. "In cases involving continuing schemes and conspiracies," like the Rothstein Ponzi
scheme, "the amount involved in the entire scheme is subject to forfeiture." See Cassella, supra
note 87, at 463.
219. 2009 Financial Crimes Report, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009 (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
220. About the Task Force, FiN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, http://www.stopfraud.
gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
221. See generally Brookner et al., supra note 205; Faith Devine and Jeffery I. Golden, Civil
Forfeiture and Bankruptcy Fraud: An Alternative to Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 25 CAL.
BANKR. J. 170 (2000); David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi




To begin, prosecuting the corporation is well within the discretion
of the federal government.222 As the literature discussed in Part I
reveals, prosecution of corporate entities has been a part of our legal
landscape for nearly two centuries. Accepting that prosecuting a corpo-
ration criminally is within the discretion of the federal government, it is
important to review the reasoning necessary to decide whether to prose-
cute. These reasons provide a useful roadmap for determining whether
to pursue corporate criminal liability when parallel bankruptcy and crim-
inal proceedings are to exist side-by-side, or more aptly put, one-by-one.
When a corporate entity is sufficiently intertwined with the perpe-
trated fraud to be named as the criminal enterprise, objections for lack of
personhood are easily overcome. Indeed, a corporation lacks the capac-
ity for intentional conduct, in the traditional sense.2 23 Courts have been
willing, however, to accept imposition of criminal liability even against
''soulless entities" when such imposition creates increased social justice.
As discussed above, imposition of criminal liability in a Rothstein-like
scenario maximizes recovery to both victims and creditors. It serves as
the most effective coordination of these enforcement efforts possible.
Further, limiting the imposition of criminal liability to instances
where the corporate entity is the criminal enterprise, defeats any chal-
lenges based on vicarious liability.2 24 Criminal liability should not be
applied carelessly, and limiting its application to scenarios that simulate
the relationship between Scott Rothstein and Rothstein, Rosenfeld &
Adler or Marc Dreier and Dreier, LLP ensures maximum fairness to
creditors, victims, and defendants alike.
Appropriate punishment reflective of the nature and level of corpo-
rate misconduct finds application in the specific criminal charge and the
resulting plea agreement. As discussed above, the Department of Justice,
when considering whether to seek a specific charge against a business
organization, analyzes a litany of factors.2 25 The purpose of this thor-
ough analysis is to ensure fairness in the charge as applied to the entity.
Further, the Department of Justice negotiates an appropriate plea agree-
ment after the grand jury indictment, where specific penalties are
detailed with respect to admitted misconduct.2 2 6 Through these two
222. Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of
Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. Miumi L. REv. 1, 7 (2010)
(stating that "federal prosecutors make the ultimate decision regarding whether a given company
will be indicted and charged for its unlawful activities" (citation omitted)).
223. See generally Khanna, supra note 8, at 1479-80.
224. See id. at 1484.
225. Thompson, supra note 52.
226. Id.
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methods, the Department of Justice endeavors to match proper punish-
ments in a way that silences arguments pertaining to effectiveness and
corporate rights.
B. Equitable Outcomes
Moving beyond the theoretical justifications, corporate criminal lia-
bility in Rothstein-like scenarios is fundamentally more equitable than
the current ad hoc administration of concurrent criminal forfeiture and
bankruptcy proceedings. Where criminal forfeiture actions tend to favor
victims and operate with an increased ability to cost-effectively marshal
investment fraud related assets,227 the federal government is not best
situated to maintain the value of all said assets to limit depreciation. 2 28
Therefore, while the battle wages on with any trustee willing to chal-
lenge the Government's forfeiture action, government attorneys must
balance the uncommon task of managing depreciating assets while
engaging in complex motion practice. On the bankruptcy side, each
motion has an expensive price tag. The more motions filed, the more
time is required of the bankruptcy trustee's attorneys. And of course, the
more time spent by those attorneys, the more the overall fee will be. As
the Bankruptcy Code requires, those fees will be paid first, before claims
of any creditors. 229 Bankruptcy fees paid to the trustee and all of his staff
can dramatically reduce the overall recovery of the victims and creditors
alike.
Given the resulting lose-lose scenario of the current approach to
concurrent bankruptcy and criminal forfeiture actions, corporate crimi-
nal liability increases recoverability and limits the ability to manipulate
current indecision over the priority of one system over the other.
Allowing the government to proceed first permits the cost-effective mar-
shaling of significantly more assets through the utilization of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the United States Marshal Service, and the
comparatively lenient forfeiture law. Combined, properties can be seized
and brought into forfeiture proceedings seamlessly. Those assets, post-
conviction, can be distributed with an eye toward preserving the value of
the assets because the Government will not charge fees that subtract
from the pool of assets. Without the interruption of the bankruptcy trus-
227. "A successful forfeiture action vests title to the forfeited assets in the government and the
government can then undertake the work of marketing and selling such things as houses and
vehicles before passing title to the proceeds to the victims at very little cost to the victims." Linn,
supra note 82, at 749.
228. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Motion to Refer All Third Party Claims to the United
States Bankruptcy Court at 12, United States v. Rothstein, No. 09-60331-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 19, 2010), ECF No. 88.
229. 11 U.S.C. § 326.
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tee attempting to intervene in the forfeiture action, depreciation of any
assets should be limited as the forfeiture action should proceed as effi-
ciently as possible.
Transferring any remaining assets to the bankruptcy trustee at the
conclusion of the forfeiture action will properly situate the bankruptcy
trustee to use his or her unique powers under the Bankruptcy Code.230
Any remaining creditors, not classified as victims and with remaining
debts, can proceed under bankruptcy procedures to file proofs of claim if
the bankruptcy proceedings have begun or proceed to initiate a bank-
ruptcy action. 23 1 Relying on clawback powers under the Bankruptcy
Code, the trustee can negate any pre-bankruptcy transfers that either
occur within the prohibited time frame or are in their nature fraudulent,
thereby augmenting any remaining assets.232 Thus, creditors not resti-
tuted in the forfeiture action would maintain an outlet for compensation
for unpaid debts. As described, corporate criminal liability provides a
means to maximize victim and creditor recovery that underscores its
equitable function.
C. Practical Applicability
Despite the theoretical awkwardness innate to the prosecution of a
corporation, its utility in properly situating bankruptcy courts with rela-
tion to district courts in concurrent proceedings outweighs the awkward-
ness. Prosecution of the corporation will situate the criminal proceeding
such that the federal government can proceed without tangling with the
bankruptcy proceeding. As an Article I tribunal, bankruptcy courts are
adjuncts to district courts and by their nature subservient to district court
proceedings.233 Yet, when the criminal enterprise and the principal
defendant together perpetrate a fraud resulting in two concomitant pro-
ceedings, this distinction is blurred. A criminal indictment against the
criminal enterprise will bring that distinction back into focus by stalling
the bankruptcy proceeding for the duration of the criminal action.
Further, the Department of Justice already has protocol to handle
the prosecution of a corporate entity.234 In determining whether to
230. See generally Nelson, supra note 113.
231. 11 U.S.C. § 501.
232. See id. §§ 547-548; James Butler Cash Jr., Note, When is an Equity Participant Actually
a Creditor? The Effects of the In re AFI Holding on Ponzi Scheme Victims and the Good Faith
Defense, 98 Ky. L. J. 329 (2010).
233. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1982); Troy A.
McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REv. 747,
765 (2010).
234. See Thompson, supra note 52.
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charge an entity, in addition to factors related to charge individuals, U.S.
Attorney's Office should consider the following:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, gov-
erning the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of
cnme . . .
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including
the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management ...
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior crimi-
nal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it ...
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and
work product protection . . .
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance pro-
gram ...
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to imple-
ment an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an
existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or ter-
minate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the rele-
vant government agencies ...
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to share-
holders, pension holders and employees not proven personally culpa-
ble and impact on the public arising from the prosecution ...
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation's malfeasance . . . [and]
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement
actions.235
The Department of Justice, also aware of the difficulty in pursuing a trial
against a corporate entity focuses attention on negotiating effective and
complete plea agreements to achieve its objectives of punishment and
deterrence.2 3 6 Indicative of contemplation centering on the theoretical
underpinnings of corporate criminal liability, these considerations reflect
the commitment of the Department of Justice to eradicating corporate
misconduct through criminal sanctions appropriately tailored to business
entities.
235. Id.
236. Id. Although prosecuting through the trial phase remains an option.
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CONCLUSION
Developing a cohesive protocol for responding to nefarious corpo-
rate behavior directed by principals who utilize their respective corpo-
rate entities is imperative. The alarming illustrations of how fraudsters
can indirectly punish victims and creditors vis-A-vis the current lack of
coordination between the federal prosecutors' offices and bankruptcy
trustees further emphasizes this need. Protecting those individuals from
undue losses can be done with agreement among U.S. Attorney's
Offices to strongly consider prosecuting corporations utilized as vehicles
for investment fraud purposes. As discussed, doing so would not only be
theoretically justified and, practically speaking, implementable, but also
would further victim and creditor recovery in such a way that would
increase the equitable nature of both criminal forfeiture and bankruptcy
proceedings related to corporate fraud.
